



Obstacle-Avoidance  
Verification  
for a Switched  
Control  
Strategy

Ray Essick

Motivation

Control of  
Switched  
Systems

3DOF  
Modeling

SpaceEx  
Verification

# Obstacle-Avoidance Verification for a Switched Control Strategy

Ray Essick

December 16, 2012



# Outline

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- 3 3DOF Modeling
- 4 SpaceEx Verification



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# Motivation



# A Motivating Example

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
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
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- Trajectory known up to a finite future horizon



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
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- Trajectory known up to a finite future horizon
- Set of possible future trajectories known.



# Hybrid System Model

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- Model behavior as a hybrid system
  - Continuous-state dynamics
  - Discrete switching in plant parameters



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- Model behavior as a hybrid system
  - Continuous-state dynamics
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- Can we guarantee trajectory tracking?
  - Yes, using a switching controller.





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- Model behavior as a hybrid system
  - Continuous-state dynamics
  - Discrete switching in plant parameters
- Can we guarantee trajectory tracking?
  - Yes, using a switching controller.
- Can we guarantee collision avoidance?
  - Analysis using SpaceEx



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# Control of Switched Systems



# Switched linear systems

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- A collection of (linear) plant parameters



# Switched linear systems

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- A collection of (linear) plant parameters
- Discrete switching logic selects the parameters at each time



# Switched linear systems

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
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SpaceEx Verification



- A collection of (linear) plant parameters
- Discrete switching logic selects the parameters at each time
- Switching graph is known, but exact switching sequence is not



# Switched linear systems

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
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- A collection of (linear) plant parameters
- Discrete switching logic selects the parameters at each time
- Switching graph is known, but exact switching sequence is not
- System dynamics given by

$$x_{t+1} = A_{\theta(t)}x_t + B_{\theta(t)}w_t$$

$$z_t = C_{\theta(t)}x_t + D_{\theta(t)}w_t$$



# Finite-path controllers

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- Controller has access to plant output and switching signal



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- Controller has access to plant output and switching signal
- Perfect observation/memory of current, past modes





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
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
SpaceEx Verification

- Controller has access to plant output and switching signal
- Perfect observation/memory of current, past modes
- Preview of a finite-horizon of future modes
- Controller parameters depend on this switching path





## $\ell_2$ -induced-norm performance



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
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## $\ell_2$ -induced-norm performance



Is there a stabilizing controller which bounds the system norm  $w \mapsto z$  uniformly?



## Brief summary of proof strategy

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- Find a (finite) collection of Lyapunov functions



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- Find a (finite) collection of Lyapunov functions
- Arrange them in the correct order for each possible switching sequence



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- Size of collection is dependent on the length of the switching window



## Brief summary of proof strategy

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3DOF Modeling

SpaceEx Verification

- Find a (finite) collection of Lyapunov functions
- Arrange them in the correct order for each possible switching sequence
- Size of collection is dependent on the length of the switching window
- Conditions are both necessary and sufficient





# Existence conditions for a controller

There exists a controller with  $L \geq 0$  and  $H \geq 0$  achieving attenuation level  $\gamma$  if and only if there exist an integer  $M \geq 0$  and matrices  $R_j \succ 0$ ,  $S_j \succ 0$  such that

$$N_{F,i_0}^T \begin{bmatrix} A_{i_0} R_{i_-} A_{i_0}^T - R_{i_+} & A_{i_0} R_{i_-} C_{1,i_0}^T & B_{1,i_0} \\ C_{1,i_0} R_{i_-} A_{i_0}^T & C_{1,i_0} R_{i_-} C_{1,i_0}^T - \gamma I & D_{11,i_0} \\ B_{1,i_0}^T & D_{11,i_0}^T & -\gamma \end{bmatrix} N_{F,i_0} \prec 0$$

$$N_{G,i_0}^T \begin{bmatrix} A_{i_0}^T S_{i_+} A_{i_0} - S_{i_-} & A_{i_0}^T S_{i_+} B_{1,i_0} & C_{1,i_0}^T \\ B_{1,i_0}^T S_{i_+} A_{i_0} & B_{1,i_0}^T S_{i_+} B_{1,i_0} - \gamma I & D_{11,i_0}^T \\ C_{1,i_0} & D_{11,i_0} & -\gamma I \end{bmatrix} N_{G,i_0} \prec 0$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} R_{i_-} & I \\ I & S_{i_-} \end{bmatrix} \succeq 0$$

for all admissible sequences  $i_{-L-M:H}$ , where

$i_- = i_{(-L-M:H-1)}$ ,  $i_+ = i_{(-L-M+1:H)}$  and

$$N_{F,i} = \begin{bmatrix} N \begin{bmatrix} B_{2,i}^T & D_{12,i}^T \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} & 0 \\ 0 & I \end{bmatrix}, \quad N_{G,i} = \begin{bmatrix} N \begin{bmatrix} C_{2,i} & D_{21,i} \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} & 0 \\ 0 & I \end{bmatrix}$$



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
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# 3DOF Modeling



# 3DOF helicopter system



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
3DOF Modeling

SpaceEx Verification

<sup>1</sup>C.W. Dever, "Parameterized maneuvers for autonomous vehicles," Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. Mech. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 2004



# 3DOF helicopter system



- Tabletop mounted system from Quanser Consulting



# 3DOF helicopter system

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
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- Tabletop mounted system from Quanser Consulting
- Nonlinear dynamics<sup>1</sup> are given by

$$\ddot{\phi} = -0.0252\dot{\phi} - 0.0525V_c^2 \sin(\psi - 0.0827)$$

$$\ddot{\beta} = -0.112\dot{\beta} - 0.243\beta - 0.504 \sin \beta + 0.04\dot{\phi}^2 + 0.0905V_c^2 \cos \psi$$

$$\ddot{\psi} = -0.163\dot{\psi} - 1.58 \sin \psi + 0.131 - 0.449\dot{\phi}^2 + 1.42V_cV_y$$

<sup>1</sup>C.W. Dever, "Parameterized maneuvers for autonomous vehicles," Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. Mech. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 2004



# Reference trajectory and linearization

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- Helicopter will travel along  $\dot{\phi}_r = -1$  rad/s and  $\beta_r = 0.2618$  rad



# Reference trajectory and linearization

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- Helicopter will travel along  $\dot{\phi}_r = -1$  rad/s and  $\beta_r = 0.2618$  rad
- Modification of hover dynamics (non-zero  $\dot{\phi}_r$ ) with disturbance



# Reference trajectory and linearization

- Helicopter will travel along  $\dot{\phi}_r = -1$  rad/s and  $\beta_r = 0.2618$  rad
- Modification of hover dynamics (non-zero  $\dot{\phi}_r$ ) with disturbance
- Resulting system:

$$\ddot{\phi} = -.257\psi - 0.0839\dot{\phi} + w_1$$

$$\ddot{\beta} = -.504\beta - .112\dot{\beta} + 1.34\tau_c + w_2$$

$$\ddot{\psi} = -1.58\psi - .163\dot{\psi} + 16.2\tau_y + w_3$$

$$\dot{\tau}_c = -6.16\tau_c + V_c$$

$$\dot{\tau}_y = -7.32\tau_y + V_y$$





# Critical outputs

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- Introduce an obstacle underneath the reference trajectory
  - Far from obstacle, matching  $\dot{\phi}_r$  and  $\beta_r$  are equally important
  - Over obstacle, controlling  $\beta$  is much more important



# Critical outputs

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- Lowest point on the helicopter is given by

$$\zeta = 0.66 \sin \beta - .277 \sin \psi$$



# Critical outputs

- Introduce an obstacle underneath the reference trajectory
  - Far from obstacle, matching  $\dot{\phi}_r$  and  $\beta_r$  are equally important
  - Over obstacle, controlling  $\beta$  is much more important

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$$\zeta = 0.66 \sin \beta - .277 \sin \psi$$

- For reference tracking, introduce the integral error  $\xi$  such that  $\dot{\xi} = \zeta - \zeta_r$



# Critical outputs

- Introduce an obstacle underneath the reference trajectory
  - Far from obstacle, matching  $\dot{\phi}_r$  and  $\beta_r$  are equally important
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- Lowest point on the helicopter is given by

$$\zeta = 0.66 \sin \beta - .277 \sin \psi$$

- For reference tracking, introduce the integral error  $\xi$  such that  $\dot{\xi} = \zeta - \zeta_r$
- When near an obstacle,  $\zeta$  and  $\xi$  represent "critical" outputs.



# Weighting of critical outputs

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- Trade-off between altitude  $(\zeta, \xi)$  and travel  $(\phi, \dot{\phi})$



# Weighting of critical outputs

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- Trade-off between altitude  $(\zeta, \xi)$  and travel  $(\phi, \dot{\phi})$
- Assign weighting based on proximity to obstacle



# Weighting of critical outputs

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- Trade-off between altitude  $(\zeta, \xi)$  and travel  $(\phi, \dot{\phi})$
- Assign weighting based on proximity to obstacle
- Let  $\delta \in [0, 1]$  be a "danger" parameter



## Weighting of critical outputs

- Trade-off between altitude  $(\zeta, \xi)$  and travel  $(\phi, \dot{\phi})$
- Assign weighting based on proximity to obstacle
- Let  $\delta \in [0, 1]$  be a "danger" parameter
- Controlled output given by

$$z = \begin{bmatrix} (1 - .9\delta)(\phi + 0.5\dot{\phi}) \\ (1 + .9\delta)(\zeta + 0.1\xi) \\ .25V_c \\ .25V_y \end{bmatrix}$$





# Constructing the switching graph

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- Approximate continuous variable  $\delta$  by discrete levels
  - More levels for finer control, higher complexity



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- Select five levels:  $\delta \in \{0, .25, .5, .75, 1\}$



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- Approximate continuous variable  $\delta$  by discrete levels
  - More levels for finer control, higher complexity
- Select five levels:  $\delta \in \{0, .25, .5, .75, 1\}$
- Allow  $\delta$  to switch between adjacent values, or to remain at either 0 or 1.



# Selecting a suitable controller

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- Solving the existence conditions for this system produces a suitable modal controller.



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- Solving the existence conditions for this system produces a suitable modal controller.
- Path-dependent controllers are also possible



# Selecting a suitable controller

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3DOF Modeling

SpaceX Verification

- Solving the existence conditions for this system produces a suitable modal controller.
- Path-dependent controllers are also possible
  - Improvements to the uniform system gain possible with increased information
- For now, consider the modal controller.



# Selecting a suitable controller

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- Solving the existence conditions for this system produces a suitable modal controller.
- Path-dependent controllers are also possible
  - Improvements to the uniform system gain possible with increased information
  - Number of controller modes grows quickly
- For now, consider the modal controller.



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# SpaceEx Verification





# Reachability and collision avoidance

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- Does the altitude error ever grow large enough to cause a collision?
  - What is the reachable set of plant states?



# Reachability and collision avoidance

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  - What is the reachable set of plant states?
- Implement closed-loop system model in SpaceEx



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- Does the altitude error ever grow large enough to cause a collision?
  - What is the reachable set of plant states?
- Implement closed-loop system model in SpaceEx
- Determine bounds on critical outputs



# Computational Difficulties

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- Computation of reachable states is large



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- Computation of reachable states is large
  - Nine plant states; nine controller states



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- Computation of reachable states is large
  - Nine plant states; nine controller states
  - Three inputs, eight outputs
- Very poor performance on a single machine



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- Very poor performance on a single machine
- Bounds can be placed on  $w$  at each time, but not on total signal norm
- Result: Bounds on reachable states are insufficient to guarantee collision avoidance





## Results and future work

Obstacle-Avoidance Verification for a Switched Control Strategy

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SpaceX Verification

- Reachability approximations are not sufficient to guarantee collision avoidance
  - Overapproximations - do not invalidate design strategy



## Results and future work

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- Reachability approximations are not sufficient to guarantee collision avoidance
  - Overapproximations - do not invalidate design strategy
- Possible solutions:
  - Improved hardware - parallel algorithms for efficient search.



## Results and future work

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- Reachability approximations are not sufficient to guarantee collision avoidance
  - Overapproximations - do not invalidate design strategy
- Possible solutions:
  - Improved hardware - parallel algorithms for efficient search.
  - Formal verification - find worst-case switching logic/disturbance



## Questions?

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# Thank you!